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I. Introduction 
 
Hundreds of studies have been conducted since Griliches (1958) suggested a method for 
measuring the benefits to agricultural research.  Alston et al. (2000) reviewed 292 
studies that reported 1,886 observations of returns to agricultural R&D.  While some 
studies consider complicated cases, most studies have focused solely on R&D policy.  
However, it is common that agricultural R&D policy is combined with other policies, 
such as a price support, subsidy policy, non-market inducement, and import restrictions. 
Naturally, when the benefits of agricultural research are measured without taking the 
related policies into account, biased estimates are likely.  
The South Korean rice industry provides a good example where several factors 
affected the adoption of new technology, causing the complications in the measurement 
of the research benefits. The agricultural R&D policy in Korea for rice was combined 
with factors such as an import ban, a price support and government purchase program, 
yield-quality trade-offs, and arguments that there are external benefits, like a public 
good, associated with self-sufficiency. It is therefore important to evaluate the benefits of 
agricultural research appropriately and carefully given these conditions.  
The revolution in rice production in Asia was triggered in 1966 with the 
development of IR8 by the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI). Based on IR8, 
Korea introduced the first high-yielding variety developed through agricultural research 
in 1972. The argument that prevailed in the 1970s (and continues to the present day) is 
that self-sufficiency in rice was a public good in Korea. This attitude affected the 
adoption of the new high-yielding varieties. The Korean government strongly encouraged 
farmers to adopt the new varieties through a government purchase policy as well as non-  2
market government inducements. The government purchase policy that had been in place 
since the 1950s was expanded in the 1970s. Most of the new variety of rice produced was 
purchased and used by the government or released back on the market at discounted 
prices.  Local officials and extension workers were provided incentives to achieve high 
local adoption rates.  An import ban was also imposed to maintain high domestic prices.  
The economic evaluation of high-yielding rice involves innovations to deal with 
several elements:  
•  The basic economics of agricultural research and development (productivity-
enhancing technology): measuring agricultural research benefits without considering 
complicating factors. A new method to measure a supply shift caused by agricultural 
R&D will be presented. 
•  The price support and government purchase program for a fixed amount of rice from 
each farm: considering that the remaining amounts were sold in the market, this 
policy acts like a decoupled income transfer that does not affect the payoff of 
agricultural research. However, with an introduction of price uncertainty, 
government purchase policy has a positive effect on production.  
•  The yield-quality tradeoffs of the technology: this tradeoff should be evaluated as a 
loss because the gross benefits of research would increase if there had not been a 
quality change. 
•  Non-market incentives for the adoption of the new variety rice: the effect of non-
market adoption is similar to that of regulation in that it generally prevents profit-
maximizers from making adjustments.   3
•  The trade policy that affected returns to higher yields: world price is considered as an 
opportunity cost. The research benefit in an open economy will be smaller than the 
benefit in a closed economy. 
•  The public good argument related to “food security” and self-sufficiency. 
Conceptual studies and a few examples from other countries have dealt with some of 
these issues, but no study has fully evaluated the issues in a real and important setting. 
For example, Lokollo (2002) explored the effects of modern technology on its adoption 
and productivity in Indonesia. The Indonesian case is very similar to the Korean case, in 
that the green revolution was driven by the government. The Philippines has also 
implemented a government purchase policy like Korea (Martinez, Shively and Masters, 
1998). However, there have been few studies that seek to analyze the effect of the 
purchase policy in terms of agricultural R&D. This paper measures the net research 
benefits derived from the development of the new high-yielding varieties performed in 
Korea given this complex setting.  During the measurement of research payoffs, several 
innovations will be presented.  
 
II. Brief History of the Korean R&D on High-Yielding Varieties 
The Korean modern varieties were developed in 1968 as a derivative of IR8. IR8 was the 
first variety of high-yielding tropical rice developed and released by the International 
Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in 1966. As soon as the potential of IR8 was recognized, 
it was widely distributed throughout rice-growing countries. Korea also received small 
sets of breeding materials from IRRI (Chandler, 1992). Research for new varieties that 
were suitable for the Korean environment had been conducted by the Rural Development   4
Administration (RDA). In 1968, IR667, a high-yielding hybrid of japonica and indica 
rice, later called Tong-il (literally meaning “unification”), was developed. One problem 
of Tong-il rice was that its quality was inferior in taste to conventional rice, in spite of its 
high-yielding features. Some researchers opposed the spread of new varieties because of 
its low quality. However, the government decided to provide Tong-il seeds for farmers at 
the end of 1968, despite the opposition by some researchers.  
Like other developing countries, the adoption process of Tong-il rice was driven 
by the government. The first problem that the Korean government had to solve was the 
insufficient supply of seeds. Though the yields of Tong-il rice were 30 percent higher 
than those of conventional varieties, the total quantity of Tong-il rice harvested at 
experimental stations in 1969 was only 12 kg. To shorten the breeding cycles and 
accelerate the release of Tong-il varieties, the RDA decided to grow Tong-il rice at the 
IRRI during the winter season (IRRI; Kim). 4 kg of Tong-il seeds sent to the IRRI in 
October, 1969, were returned as 600 kg in the spring of 1970, and 10 kg in the fall of 
1970 were returned as 4.3 M/T in the spring of 1971. In 1972, the RDA got 17,000 M/T 
from the IRRI. 
Besides the insufficient supply of seeds, the RDA was short-handed with the 
necessary technical consultants to help farmers who adopted Tong-il rice. To settle the 
problem, the RDA employed 1,870 new extension workers in the spring of 1972. Given 
that the total number of RDA extension workers in 1971 was 2,877, this increase was 
substantial. These new extension workers were employed solely for the adoption of 
Tong-il rice. Their primary tasks were to visit and consult with farmers, to persuade   5
growers who did not favor Tong-il rice, to monitor the growing situation of Tong-il rice, 
and to report any diseases and insects observed in Tong-il fields to RDA headquarters.  
With sufficient seeds and extension workers, and some promising results of field 
tests, Tong-il began to be adopted on Korean farms in 1972 (Kim, 1978). To enhance the 
adoption rates, a target level of adoption was assigned to each extension worker in the 
provinces. During the adoption process, some extension workers physically removed 
other varieties from the field that had already been planted in some extreme cases, in 
order to raise the adoption rate assigned to them. The speed of adoption rate for Tong-il 
rice was so fast that the total area producing Tong-il expanded from 9.2% of the total rice 
cultivated  areas in 1972 to 75.5% in 1978 (MAF).  
The Korean government took advantage of a purchase policy for rice as well. 
Though the government purchase program had been implemented since the 1950s, the 
program changed fundamentally in the 1970s when Tong-il rice was introduced. With 
the introduction of Tong-il rice, the government raised the supported prices and 
expanded the quantities bought by the government. Under this program, real rice prices 
rose 5.7 percent annually between 1969 and 1979. Compared to the annual growth rate 
of 2.4 percent between 1980 and 1990, and –1.1 percent between 1991 and 2000, the rate 
in the 1970s was high. The quantities purchased by the government expanded from 0.35 
million M/T in 1970 to 1.4 million M/T in 1978. These quantities accounted for 8.9 
percent and 23.4 percent of total rice production. Despite low quality, the Korean 
government set the same price for Tong-il rice as conventional rice so that farmers who 
adopted Tong-il rice could sell more rice at the same price as conventional varieties.    6
The development and dissemination of Tong-il, combined with other policies, led 
to self-sufficiency in rice by 1976. However, the favorable situation for Tong-il was 
reversed by two events that occurred between 1978 and 1980. One was the outbreak of 
rice blast disease and the other was the turnover of political power. Although some 
Tong-il varieties were developed to be resistant to diseases, its tolerance to rice blast 
disease was not good. After an initial outbreak in 1978, blast disease combined with cold 
weather considerably reduced the 1980 harvest. Between 1979 and 1980, production fell 
by 36 percent, from 5,545 thousand tons to 3,529 thousand tons. 
The political turnover had more important implications for the production of 
Tong-il. With this event as a turning point, Tong-il was on the decline. The high price 
policy was moderated and Tong-il was no longer strongly recommended. The growth 
rate of the government purchase price dropped substantially: it increased by only 0.1 
percent in 1982 and decreased by 3.4 percent in 1983. The slow growth in prices 
continued until the consent of the National Assembly was restored in 1987. Even after 
the revival, the growth rate of the rice price was not as high as that experienced in the 
1970s. Then, in 1989 Tong-il began to be purchased separately from other varieties at a 
lower price. The government finally stopped purchasing Tong-il in 1992. After 1992, 
Tong-il rice was no longer planted at farms’ level.  
 
III. Measuring Research Benefits 
The returns to the R&D on the high-yielding varieties are here measured in terms of 
welfare changes: a sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Though some argue 
that the economic surplus is not a correct measure of welfare change, it is generally   7
accepted that the surplus is one of the most plausible measures when the information is 
highly restricting
1. The importance of functional forms and features of supply shifts has 
been controversial for a long time as well. However, a persuasive conclusion was drawn 
by Rose in 1980. He insisted that the parallel shift of supply is the only realistic strategy 
that can be chosen when there is little information on the shape of the supply curve or the 
position at which the single estimate applies (Rose, 1980, p.837). Alston et al. (1995) 
argued, further, that if there is an assumption that the supply shifts induced by research is 
parallel, then, “the functional forms of supply and demand are unimportant and it is 
convenient to use a local linear approximation…” (p.64). Hence, we can assume that 
supply and demand functions are linear, and that the research-induced supply shift is 
parallel. 
  In this paper, the first measurement will be done without considering 
complicating factors. Thus, the results are likely to be overestimated. After being 
measured in the simplest setting, research payoffs will be re-measured, considering the 
complicating factors one by one.  
 
3.1.  Measuring Research Benefits in the Simplest Setting 
As a baseline, we measure the returns to the research on the high-yielding varieties 
(Tong-il rice) without considering complicating factors. It is assumed that the supply-and-
demand functions are linear and that the research-induced shift is parallel. In Figure 1, a 
parallel shift of linear supply is demonstrated. 
T D  and 
T S  are the demand and supply 
curves observed in the market with Tong-il in place. If Tong-il had not been developed, 
                                                 
1For a more detailed discussion on this issue, see Alston et al., pp. 44-48, 1995.   8
the supply curve would have shifted up by w ( 1 w  and  2 w ) to 
NT S  because Tong-il was a 
yield-increasing or a cost-saving technology. As seen in Figure 1, it is assumed that there 
exists a point along the supply curve where the slope of the supply curve changes 
substantially (e.g. point j  in Figure 1). This assumption is necessary, in order not to 
allow a supply curve to have a negative intercept in the linear supply curve. A negative 
intercept of the supply curve implies that some quantities are produced at negative prices.  
 
Figure 1.   Aggregated Supply and Demand for Rice in Korea with Shifts Induced  
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Further, if the possibility of the negative intercepts is not eliminated, the estimates from 
the supply curves with negative intercepts are likely to be slightly overstated, unless the 
supply is infinitely elastic. In Figure 1, 
T H  and 
T L  designate the price and quantity levels 
at the kink when Tong-il is in place. The price and quantity levels at the kink when Tong-
il is not in place are illustrated by 
NT H  and 
NT L . Since those price and quantity levels, in 
fact, are not the actual price and quantity observable at market, they are represented by 
H  for price and L for quantity, rather than P  and Q
2. 
 
Data for Measuring Gross Research Benefits  
There are two kinds of price data: the farm-gate prices of Tong-il and conventional rice, 
and the government purchase prices. The source of the farm-gate prices is the National 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation (NACF), which surveyed and released farm-gate 
prices. The government purchase prices are the prices set annually by the government for 
a certain amount of rice. The prices of Tong-il rice during the 1972-75 period were 
missing, because most of the Tong-il rice produced during that period was purchased by 
the government for seeds for the next year. Those prices were calculated by multiplying 
the farm-gate prices of conventional rice by 0.829 (average ratio of Tong-il prices over 
conventional prices). All prices were deflated by the CPI (2000=100).  
The yield data used for the calculation of the benefits of Tong-il research were the 
national average yields of the rice industry. All yields were based on milled rice. On the 
basis of representative values found in the literature, -0.3 for demand elasticity, and 0.5 
for supply elasticity were chosen for the calculation of the research benefits. 
                                                 
2 From now on, the superscript T  and NT  imply the situation with Tong-il in place and not in place, 
respectively. The subscript T  and C  indicate Tong-il and conventional rice.    10
 
Expenditures on Research and Extension of Tong-il 
The Korean government, through the Rural Development Administration (RDA), 
primarily drove the development, release, and adoption of Tong-il rice. Few private 
research institutes existed in the 1960s and 1970s. Because research done on Tong-il by 
private firms was negligible, expenditure data from the RDA were used as the research 
cost data. The RDA had many intramural research institutes, but only five of these 
institutes were related to rice research: the Rice Research Institute, the National Crop 
Experiment Station, the Institute of Agricultural Science, the Agricultural Mechanization 
Institute, and the Agricultural Chemicals Research Institute
3. The data set for these 
institutes’ expenditures on rice research was established by Suh (1992) and was used for 
this research
4.  
Research on high-yielding rice varieties began in 1965 (Kim, pp. 24-25). 
However, it was difficult to separate the expenditures on Tong-il research from the 
research expenditures on other rice varieties. It was assumed that 25 percent of the 1965 
research expenditures on rice were assigned to the development of Tong-il. Furthermore, 
it was assumed that this percentage had grown by 2.5 percent each year until 1979, when 
it reached its peak at 60 percent. After 1979, it fell by 5 percent until 1990 when the 
percentage was kept at 1 percent in 1991 and 1992. 
Expenditures for extension were allocated by local governments as well as by the 
RDA. For both sets of extension expenditures, Choi et al.’s (2004) data were used. In 
addition, it was assumed that 80 percent of total extension expenditures were spent on 
                                                 
3 For the history and complete list of the RDA’s intramural institutes, see Choi et al., 2004. 
4 For the description of this data set, see Suh (1992), p. 65.   11
Tong-il
5. This trend continued through 1979. After 1979, the expenditures on Tong-il 
decreased by 10 percent until 1986. The expenditures decreased by 5 percent in 1987, and 
have remained at 1 percent of total expenditures on rice since 1988. All expenditures 
were deflated by the CPI (2000 = 100).  
 
Measuring the Research-Induced Supply Shift 
One of the important issues related to estimation of research payoffs is to measure the 
supply shifts induced by research. When the innovation is related to the improvement in 
yield of a crop, there is a simple way to measure the supply shift.  
Let 
C y  and  T y  be the yields of conventional and Tong-il rice, and 
C A  and  T A  be 
the area of conventional and Tong-il rice (
T C A A A + = ). Expressing the quantities in terms 
of yield and area, 
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where  NT Q  and  T Q  indicate the total quantities before and after the introduction of new 
high-yielding varieties.  T
C Q  and 
T
T Q   represent the quantities of conventional and new 
varieties with high-yielding varieties in place. Then, a J   percent horizontal shift is 
measured as,  

































                                                 
5 This assumption does not look unreasonable, considering the situation of the 1970s. In the 1970s, the 
extension service (including local governments) focused entirely on the adoption and cultivation of Tong-il.    12
where  * Q   is the quantity when the new varieties are adopted 100 percent. Some 
calculations lead to the following: 















where  ) / ) ( ( T C T y y y − ≡ δ  and  ) / ( A A h T ≡   indicate yield gains over old varieties and 
adoption rate of high-yielding varieties, respectively
6.  
One important implication of (3) is how much a supply curve shifts out depends 
on just two parameters: adoption rate and relative yield difference. If we know the 
information on adoption rates of new varieties and relative yield differences between 
new and old varieties, the supply shift can easily be measured, without the complicating 
process of calculation. In addition, (3) does not require any specific functional form, in 
order to calculate a percent horizontal shift. Neither specific elasticities of demand nor 
supply are needed. As long as the technical change is associated with yield improvement, 
a horizontal shift induced by agricultural research can always be measured with adoption 
rates and yield gains of new varieties.  
However, we need the information on supply elasticity to convert a horizontal 
shift to a vertical shift. By definition, a horizontal shift is,  
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where ε  is the elasticity of supply and K  is a vertical shift in percentage term. That is, 
the horizontal shift can be expressed in terms of a vertical shift using the relationship of 
(4), once a horizontal shift is measured. As seen in (4), when a supply shift is expressed 
                                                 
6 If (3) is applied, the supply shifts in the cases of Griliches (1958), Ayer and Schuh (1972), and Akino and 
Hayami (1975) are not correct. For example, the horizontal shift in Griliches is calculated as 
912 . 0 ) 9 . 0 13 . 0 13 . 0 1 /( 9 . 0 = × + − = J  because  13 . 0 = δ  and  9 . 0 = h .   13
by a vertical shift, the magnitude of K  is very sensitive to the change in the supply 
elasticity because  ε / J K =
7.  
 
Measuring Research Benefits 
Applying the above formula, research benefits are measured. For simplicity and 
comparison, the internal rate of return (IRR) and the benefit-cost ratio (B/C ratio) are 
presented in Table 1. We have very high internal rate of returns. The internal rate of 
return of 229% implies that 1 dollar spent on research, on the average, earns 2.29 dollars 
per year from the first year to the last year. These results are much higher than the results 
observed in other studies. For example, Griliches (1958) estimated the IRR as 35-40% for 
hybrid corn and Peterson (1967) calculated it as 33% for poultry research. The internal 
rates of returns of Ayer and Schuh (1972) for cotton research ranged from 77 to 110%, 
depending on the assumptions. For rice research, the estimates of Akino and Hayami 
(1975) were between 73% and 75%, and the estimate of Suh (1992) was 81.8%.  
Two factors can explain these high estimates. First, the cost of developing high-
yielding varieties was very low because the research on high-yielding rice in Korea was 
performed on the basis of IR 667, already developed by the IRRI. Using the already-
developed technology prevented the government from investing more resources on “dry 
holes,” inevitable in the process of research. Second, our estimates are high because we 
assume that the whole supply shift is induced solely by the Tong-il research. However, 
many factors could have affected the yields and acreage of Tong-il rice, as well as 
research and extension. For example, the yields of Tong-il rice are affected by inputs, 
irrigation, weather conditions, and disease or natural disasters. The Tong-il acreage is also 
                                                 
7 The sensitivity of a vertical shift was examined by Oehmke and Crawford (2002).   14
affected by the expectations on yield differences, market prices, and government 
purchase price and quantity as well as extension. Thus, if the effects of those factors 
stated above are taken into account, the actual payoffs to research and extension would be 
much smaller than the estimates obtained from the rough calculation. In addition, the 
consideration of government purchase policy, a quality change, involuntary adoption, and 
an import ban would reduce the payoffs even further.  
 
3.2.   Direct Measurement 
So far, we implicitly assume that the whole shift of the supply curve is induced by Tong-
il research and extension. This method is almost always likely to overestimate the 
research payoffs because all magnitude of supply shifts is not caused by research and 
extension. That is also the reasons for exceptionally high research returns in agricultural 
investment.  
In the previous section, we showed that supply curve shifts out by the quantity of 
new varieties, so a J  percent horizontal shift is measured by dividing the output of new 
varieties by total output. The actual horizontal shift expressed with a quantity term, not a 
percentage term, can be written as follows:  






T A y Q Q Q = = − . 
One of the most important factors in measuring the research benefits is the size of supply 
shift. According to (5), the supply shift can be expressed in terms of yield and area of 
new varieties. In general, the yields are not affected by government policies, such as a 
price support or a purchase program. Rather, the yields are affected by inputs, land 
quality, weather, diseases and pests, and research. The area is affected by price and yield   15
differences between new and old varieties, extension, and government policies. If we find 
the effects of research on yields and the impacts of extension on acreage, it is possible to 
measure directly the benefits induced by agricultural research.  
First, we need to measure the stock of knowledge created by the research because 
the current fruits of the research are obtained by the knowledge accumulated from the 
past. The knowledge stock is accumulated exactly by the difference between knowledge 
not in use and newly-added knowledge by the associated research. Since it is difficult to 
measure directly the knowledge stock, though, researchers have usually used the 
aggregated research expenditures as a proxy for the knowledge stock. 
In addition, we need to distinguish the research done to develop a new product 
from the research carried out to maintain or improve one or two features of the developed 
varieties. The contributions of two kinds of research to the yields of Tong-il rice were not 
the same. In general, the research done in the initial stage has more impacts than the 
follow-up research. For example, the level of Tong-il yields that could be obtained at the 
farms’ level was already determined, though fluctuated, when Tong-il was developed. In 
other words, the high yields of Tong-il rice did not arise proportionately to the investment 
on Tong-il research. The potential yields of Tong-il rice already reached a certain level 
and the actual yields of each year fluctuated because of several other factors, such as 
inputs, land quality, weather conditions, and the follow-up research. Thus, the aggregated 
effects of research are the sum of effects of the initial research and the follow-up research.  
The potential yields of Tong-il rice were assumed to be the mean of the realized 
yields of Tong-il rice. The mean of Tong-il rice from 1972 to 1991 was 475.80kg/10a. 
The effects of the follow-up research were estimated through a regression analysis. The   16
deviations of the yields subtracted from the mean, instead of actual yields, were built as 
the dependent variable of the regression. An aggregated research expenditure variable 
( t R ), included as a right-hand side variable in the regression, is calculated from the 
inverted V-shape lag profile. The research effect is assumed to continue to 7 years
8. 
  Besides the research expenditure variable, other variables (rain, temperature, 
irrigated area, and affected area by disaster) that cause the supply curve to shift were put 
in the regression equation. To catch the effect of the lowest level of harvest in 1980, a 
dummy variable was inserted as well. The result of the regression is: 
(6)     ) ( 815 . 11 ) ( 25495 . 0 ) ( 6790 . 1 014712 . 0 82 . 284 Temp Rain Fert R mean y t T + − + − − = −  
                                (248.4)      (1.182)         (1.689)              (0.05494)            (8.931)
 
 
80 12 . 164 ) ( 21353 . 0 ) ( 031503 . 0 D Disaster Irri − + + , 
(0.05234)           (0.6752)                    (41.87)
*** 
 
20 = n ,  8096 . 0




***  imply that the estimate is significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The values in parentheses are standard errors. 
The estimate of the follow-up research turns out to be insignificant. This result 
entails that the additional research did not contribute to the increase in yields of Tong-il 
rice. The follow-up research, in fact, was focused on the quality improvement of Tong-il 
rice rather than the yield enhancement. Thus, the insignificant estimate of research is 
compatible with the Tong-il history. Based on the regression results, the mean was taken 
as the total effects. There are no significant estimates among other variables except for 
80 D .  The significant estimate of  80 D implies that the Tong-il yields of 1980 was 164.12 
kg/10a lower than the mean of yields.  
                                                 
8 For the detailed discussion on lag structure of research expenditures, see Alston et al., p.179, 1995. 
   17
We need one more regression equation: an area response. When farmers make 
production decisions in the spring, farmers consider output prices, yields, and 
government prices and quantities. However, market prices, yield differences, and 
government’s prices and quantities are not known until harvest. Thus, farmers have to 
make production decisions on the basis of their expectations on those variables. Most of 
the available information that farmers can use at the time of planting is the past 
experience and the past data on prices and yields.  
There are several ways to form the expectations, such as naïve, extrapolative, 
adaptive, and rational expectations (for detail, see Nerlove and Bessler, 2001). For 
simplicity, we present here the case of naive expectations. The regression result is, 
(7)     ] ) [( 44270 . 0 ] ) [( 81 . 296 ] ) [( 9884 . 2 020 , 343 , 1 1 1 t G T t t C T t t C T t T Q E y y E P P E A − − − + − + − − − =  
                 (102,400)
**    (3.219)                          (518.2)                             (0.05494)
*** 
 
80 72 915 , 15 ) ( 419 , 12 − − + D Ext t , 
(2,693)
***            (73,290) 
 
19 = n ,  9301 . 0




*** imply that the estimate is significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The values in parentheses are standard errors. 
We have the robust estimate of extension. The robust estimate of extension entails 
that extension contributed to the increases in Tong-il acreage. The acreage affected by 
extension is calculated by multiplying the extension expenditures by the estimate of 
extension obtained in the area regression equation. The differentials of price and yield 
proved not to affect the Tong-il areas.  
One interesting result is the estimate of the government quantity. According to 
traditional theories, government price and/or government quantity do not affect the 
market situation. However, our estimate contradicts the traditional theory. Unlike the   18
traditional theory, Tong-il quantities purchased last year by the government affects this 
year’s Tong-il areas. This result will be discussed in detail in the section of government 
purchase policy. 
The IRR and the B/C ratios estimated in the directly-measured way are presented in 
Table 1. The B/C ratios drop, while the IRR rises. The B/C ratios decrease because we 
measured the effects of only research and extension on Tong-il’s yields and adoption 
rates. The decreases in the B/C ratio are affected by the changes in the adoption rates 
rather than the changes in yields, because the potential yield is assumed to be the same as 
the mean of the actual yields. The IRR rises because the adoption rates of the early years 
obtained from the regression were higher than the actual adoption rates. High adoption 
rates lead to high research benefits.  
 
3.3. Spillovers 
The other factor we should take into account is the spillovers. In the Tong-il case, some 
researchers pointed out that some production technology developed for Tong-il was also 
applied to conventional rice, leading to the enhancement in the yields of non-Tong-il rice. 
For example, Ju (1980) reported that the yields of conventional rice increased 
substantially through the application of Tong-il technology to conventional rice. If we do 
not consider the spillovers in spite of the obvious evidence, the research benefits 
measured under the assumption of absent spillovers are likely to be underestimated. 
Let us divide the yields of conventional rice into two parts: yields contributed by 
research, inputs, and weather, and yield increases caused by the spillovers from Tong-il   19
rice. Let 
*
C y  be yields with the spillovers and  C s  be yield increases due to the spillovers. 
Then, the actual yields of conventional rice are: 
(8)                                           C C C s y y + =
* . 
Then, the percentage change in yields is: 
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Thus, if the yields effects of the spillovers are not subtracted from the actual yields, the 
estimates are likely to be underrated, as long as  C s   is positive. The spillover effects 
should be appropriately dealt with, because there would not have been spillovers, if Tong-
il rice had not been developed.   
There is no easy way to measure the spillover effects because the spillover effects 
are not observed directly. Due to the difficulty in direct measurement, the spillover 
effects are here estimated through the residuals. The yield of conventional rice is a 
function of inputs, irrigation, weather, disaster, research, spillovers from the other 
varieties, and unobservable disturbances. Thus, if some systemic effects are still observed 
even after the effects of other variables are eliminated, the remaining effects are likely to 
be the spillovers. However, the method of a dummy variable is almost always subject to 
the criticism that other factors unknown so far could affect the estimate of a dummy 
variable as well as the factor of our interest. In fact, we cannot exclude completely the 
possibility that other factors may have affected the yields of conventional rice. However, 
if we can exclude the effects of other variables as many as possible, we can get an 
approximate estimate for the spillovers.    20
To find out the effects of the spillovers, a regression was run. The variables are 
the same as specified before. The results of the regression are, 
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*** imply that the estimate is significant at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
The values in parentheses are standard errors. 
In the regression, research expenditures on conventional rice, fertilizer, 
temperature, and rain do not explain appropriately the changes in the yield of 
conventional rice. The estimate of the trend variable is significant, while the estimate of 
research expenditures is not significant. The trend variable usually explains the effects of 
yield increases caused by the technical improvement of farmers from the past cumulative 
experience and maintenance research of government or related research institutions. The 
results of regression tell us that the yields of conventional rice rose due to the cumulative 
knowledge from farmers’ experiences, rather than the research. The estimate of the 
dummy for 1980 is also significant.  
Our attention here is paid to the dummy for 1976-1991. The significant dummy 
variable entails that there are some other factors that affected the yields of conventional 
rice, besides traditional factors that generally affect production. If the dummy can be 
interpreted as the spillover effects of Tong-il technology, the regression results suggest 
that 25.74 kg/10a in conventional rice yields is obtained from Tong-il technology. 
However, it is still not certain whether the yield gains came from the spillovers of 
technology developed for Tong-il rice.   21
Some evidence exists that supports both the direct and indirect spillovers of Tong-
il technology. Because Tong-il rice had never been introduced before and growers had no 
experience with Tong-il rice, new innovations associated with seeding and planting Tong-
il rice, and new methods related to applying fertilizers and chemicals were developed. 
According to some literature (Ju, 1980; Kim, 1978), the innovations developed for Tong-
il rice were also spread to and adopted by the farmers who grew conventional rice. One of 
the most important innovations was the introduction of plastic film to cover the seed beds 
so that seeds could be protected from cold weather at night (Kim 1978; Seo 1983). The 
introduction of plastic film lengthened the growing period of rice, resulting in more 
output at harvest. A few years later, most seedbeds were covered with plastic film
9.  
There also exists some indirect evidence to support the spillover effect. Tong-il 
required good quality of paddy lands with good irrigation systems to produce high yields. 
High yields were accomplished only when supported by a stable water supply and high 
temperatures (Shim and Lockwood 1975; Kwon 1974). Lots of good quality paddy land 
was switched to Tong-il rice. Thus, the adoption of Tong-il must have been negatively 
linked to the yields of conventional rice. Despite the negative impacts, the yields of 
conventional rice continued to increase over time. This may be indirect evidence of the 
spillovers because the yields of conventional rice must have fallen if a lot of paddy plots 
with good quality were switched to Tong-il rice.  
The consideration of the spillovers slightly increases the research benefits, 
compared to the case where the spillovers are not taken into account. Since the 
expenditures are not affected by the spillovers, the net present values rise. The increased 
                                                 
9 The rate of seedbeds covered with plastic film was 27% in 1972. The rate continued to rise to 38% in 
1974, 56% in 1975, 65% in 1976, and 81% in 1977 (Kim, p.187).    22
net present values lead to a rise in the B/C ratio. The B/C ratio rises slightly from 128 to 
132 with a 5 percent external rate of interest and from 125 to 129 with a 10 percent 
external rate of interest. The IRR, however, does not change at all.  
 
IV. Measuring Research Benefits Considering Government Purchase Policy 
In general, market prices are not affected by government purchase policies under a 
certain market price because the total demand for the product is fixed in the short run. 
Most of the product purchased by the government is usually released back to consumers 
in some form, such as resale to market, assistance to the poor, food for the military, and 
food aid to victims of disaster. Market prices are not still affected when the government 
increases purchase quantities, because the increased quantity of the government 
purchases represents a portion of market demand, rather than new demand. That is, 
government purchase policies do not create new demand in rice market, unless the 
government throws away or exports the purchased product. In the short run, market price 
is independent of the government's purchase policy.  
The historical observations of the rice purchase program of Korea, however, show 
that government purchase policies are closely related with production. In Korea, the 
government used purchase policies to accelerate production in the 1970s and 1980s. The 
government continued to raise the supported price and to increase the government 
quantity purchased from farmers. Government prices were also kept higher than market 
prices in most periods. As seen in Figure 2, the quantity of government purchases moved 
along with total production over the whole period. These trends suggest that the   23
government purchase policy and total output are not independent of each other
10. In such 
cases, it is not appropriate to apply the traditional model to government purchase policy.  
 



























There are three possible ways that government purchase policies can affect the market: 
proportionate purchase of output, stock, and price uncertainty. The proportionate 
purchases can affect the market because farmers will get higher incomes as they produce 
more. However, as seen in Figure 3, the government quantity in the Korean purchase 
policy was not been determined in such a way. The share of government quantity in total 
production fluctuated quite a bit, rather than remaining stable. Putting it another way, the 
                                                 
10  The similar trends of government quantity and output were also observed in China. The Chinese 
government kept a quota policy on rice for several decades. Unlikely the Korean purchase policy, 
government prices or prices for quota rice were set below market price. Hence, the Chinese quota policy 
was a kind of lump-sum tax, rather than a lump-sum subsidy. According to Wang et al. (2003), the level of 
quota moved along with the level of total production between 1970 and 1984. After 1984, quota decreased 
substantially, while production continued to increase. However, the trends of production and quota 
continued to move together, though the difference between production and quota became larger than 
before. For detail on the Chinese quota policy and figures of the trends, see Wang et al. (2003). 
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quantities purchased by the Korean government were not determined proportionately to 
the level of total output. Thus, it is not appropriate to apply this model to the Korean 
purchase policy.  
 































The uncertainty of price is known to have a negative effect on production. Sandmo’s 
article (1971) has been cited as one of the first papers that showed the negative 
relationship between price uncertainty and its effects on production. Sandmo showed that 
the expected market price is larger than a competitive firm’s marginal cost. With a 
smaller marginal cost than the expected market price, Sandmo said that “under price 
uncertainty, output is smaller than the certainty output” (p.66-67). In addition, Sandmo 
demonstrated that the variability of price also affects production. A risk-averse firm   25
would reduce its production if the variability of price increases. Sandmo’s idea can also 
be applied to our model of government purchase policies.  
Suppose that the utility function satisfies the von Neumann-Morgenstern theorem 
and that the utility function is bounded from the above. In addition, assume that 
government price and quantity are given exogenously. A risk-averse farmer now 
maximizes her expected utility by choosing the quantity to be sold at market. The 
expected utility maximization problem of the farmer in our model with respect to  M Q  is
11, 
(11)                                   ))] ( ( [ max Q C PQ Q P U E M G G − + . 
The first and second order conditions are, 
(12)                                     0 ))] ( ' )( ( ' [ = − Q C P U E π , 
(13)                        0 )] ( ' ' ) ( ' )) ( ' )( ( ' ' [
2 < − − = Q C U Q C P U E D π π .   
Let us examine the effects of a small increase in government quantity on total output. 
Since total output is the sum of quantities to be sold to the government and sold at 
market, total effects of government quantity are, 
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Applying the implicit function theorem, we have 
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Thus, (14) becomes  
                                                 
11 Holthausen (1979) analyzed the effects of hedging of competitive firms under price uncertainty. The 
model of Holthausen is very similar to our model, in that a firm in the Holthausen model may either sell its 
output in the future at a random market price or sell forward at a certain price. However, our model is 
different from the Holthausen model because the certain price in our model is set by the government, so the 
government price can be set at any level, depending on what the motives of the government are. On the 
other hand, the hedging price in the Holthausen model is determined at market, so hedging price and 
market price tend to converge. This convergence of prices cannot take place in a government purchase 
model.    26
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Considering that the denominator of (16) is negative, it is certain that the sign of the 
above equation (16) depends entirely on the numerator. The first term of the numerator is 
definitely negative. If the second term of the numerator is negative, (16) obviously 
becomes positive. If we assume the decreasing absolute risk aversion, we can show that 
the second term is also negative. In other words,  
(17)                          0 ))] ( ' ))( ( ' )( ( ' ' [ ≥ − − Q C P Q C P U E G π . 
This proves the statement that a rise in government quantity increases output of risk-
averse farmers under price uncertainty. That is, government purchase policies are no 
longer independent of output when there exists the uncertainty of market price. 
According to Sandmo, risk-averse farmers produce less under price uncertainty than 
certainty. However, the above result suggests that risk-averse farmers would increase 
output level if the government purchases a fixed quantity at a fixed price from them. 
Government purchase policies can increase the reduced output caused by price 
uncertainty to a certain level. Whether the increased output is less than or the same as the 
output under price certainty, depends on the degree of risk aversion of farmers.  
  The government purchase policy, as seen above, is not independent of output. The 
dependence of output on government purchase policies indicates that the whole shift of 
supply curve is not induced by research and extension. In other words, a portion of the 
supply shift observed at market was caused by the government purchase policy. Thus, the 
effects of the government purchase policy have to be subtracted from the research 
benefits, in order to get more accurate estimates.    27
  The estimate of government quantity was taken from the results of naïve 
expectations in (7). It is assumed that the adoption rates of Tong-il rice do not change. 
After subtracting the quantity caused by government purchase policy from total 
production, research benefits are recalculated. The results are shown in Table 1 for 
comparison. When government purchase policy is considered, the research benefits 
expressed in terms of the IRR and the B/C ratio decrease slightly. That is, the 
consideration of government purchase policy reduces the research benefits but the decline 
is not substantial.  
 
V. Research Benefits Considering a Quality Change 
We have, so far, dealt with two different qualities of rice as a single product with no 
quality differences. However, Tong-il was a quality-degrading technology, despite its 
yield improvement and savings. High quality rice in Korea should be sticky, besides 
general quality characteristics, such as shape, chalkiness, the percentage of whole kernels, 
and fragrance. Tong-il rice was much less sticky than conventional rice, so Tong-il was 
recognized as low-quality rice.  
  The quality difference between two rice varieties was evaluated at market as the 
difference in price. Tong-il’s prices were always below conventional rice’s prices. In 
general, the price differential at market between conventional and Tong-il rice was 
around 15 percent. This differential indicates that consumers get a 15 percent lower 
utility from Tong-il rice than conventional rice, even though the same quantity is 
consumed. The difference in utility per unit is a loss caused by the inferior quality of 
Tong-il rice. The gross benefits of research would have been higher if there had not been   28
a quality change in Tong-il rice. This loss has to be subtracted from the total research 
benefits of Tong-il rice. Subtracting the loss caused by a quality change from the total 
benefits will provide a more correct measure of the social benefits of agricultural research 
invested in Tong-il rice. 
If we assume that Tong-il and conventional rice was perfect substitutes in 
consumption and that the portion between two varieties is independent of price changes, 
we can deal with two different qualities of rice like a single product in an integrated 
model. Further, a quality change can be represented by a shift in demand, in that a quality 
change of a product is evaluated through price at market by consumers, not producers. 
If the quality of Tong-il and conventional rice is the same, total rice demand is  
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where 
d Q , 
d
T Q , and 
d
C Q  indicate total demand, demand for Tong-il rice, and demand for 
conventional rice, respectively.  ' h  is the share of Tong-il rice in total production. 
However, Tong-il rice was inferior in quality to conventional rice and the low quality was 
reflected by the price difference. The price differential calculated from the actual prices 
is, on average, 17.1 percent and the scale factor is 0.854. In other words, consumers do 
not distinguish between Tong-il and conventional rice if one unit of Tong-il rice is traded 
with 0.854 units of conventional rice. This implies that 1.171 units of Tong-il rice has to 
be given up to get 1 unit of conventional rice. Applying the discount factor, market 
demand is 
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Thus, the demand with a quality change is below the original demand curve without a 
quality change. From (18) and (19), a horizontal shift caused by a quality change is   29
measured as  ' ) 854 . 0 1 ( ' h J × − = , where  ' J  is a horizontal shift in the demand curve. Once 
the horizontal shift is measured, a vertical shift in the demand curve can also be 
measured, using the following relationship,  
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where η  is demand elasticity and  ' K  is a vertical shift in the demand curve.  
The results of the subtraction of losses caused the quality change are presented in 
Table 1, with other results. The consideration of the quality change decreases the B/C 
ratios considerably, while the IRRs fall slightly. The small change in the IRR is induced 
by the time structure of research benefits because of the large magnitude of research 
benefits accrued in the early years.  
 
Table 1.  Research Benefits in terms of IRR and B/C Ratio  
     Estimation Method 
     ( 3 . 0 − = η ,  5 . 0 1 = ε ,  0 . 1 2 = ε ) 






      
IRR (%)    Case I
1 229  255  255 
   Case  II
2 224  249  249 
   Case  III
3 210  241  241 
          
B/C Ratio  r=0.05  Case I
1 170  128  132 
   Case  II
2 142  109  112 
   Case  III
3 74  41  44 
          
 r=0.10  Case  I
1 154  125  129 
   Case  II
2 128  107  110 
   Case  III
3 67  46  49 
          
Note: 1.  research benefits estimated without considering other factors. 
          2.  research benefits estimated, considering government purchase policy. 
          3.  research benefits estimated, considering government purchase policy and  a quality change. 
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we measured the net returns to agricultural research on Tong-il rice in such 
a way that the effects of other factors were eliminated one by one, in order to get more 
accurate estimates.  When measured without other complicating factors, the research 
payoffs were relatively high. However, research benefits decreased as other factors were 
taken into account. In particular, the B/C ratios fell substantially when other factors were 
considered. So far, the research benefits of Tong-il innovation have been known to be 
very high (Suh, 1992). However, the actual welfare gains turned out to be low when all 
the losses induced by the introduction of Tong-il rice were subtracted. In addition, the 
payoffs will decrease even further if the effects of involuntary adoption and an import 
ban are considered.  
During the measurement of the research benefits, we brought forward several 
innovations. First, we showed that a horizontal shift induced by research can easily be 
measured if the research is associated with the enhancement in yield of a crop. In this 
case all information we need is just yield gains and adoption rates. We also suggested that 
the actual research benefits mixed with other factors can be separated from other factors, 
leading to more accurate estimates. We also demonstrated that government purchase 
policy has a positive effect on production under price uncertainty. This result contradicts 
the traditional theory because government purchase policy has been considered as a 
lump-sum tax or subsidy in the traditional theory. We showed as well that the shift in the 
demand curve caused by a quality change can be measured if the information on the price 
differential of two products at market is known.     31
One important implication of this paper is that the actual welfare gains would not 
be so high, if the innovation is introduced with market-distorting policies. Considering 
that an innovation in developing countries is adopted through a similar process of the 
Tong-il case in Korea, the findings of this paper have much implication to developing 
countries that have already taken, or will take a similar path of the Korean case. 
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